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I~

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
F.RYIN G. RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 10164

\\'ARDEN JOHN W. TURNER,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE~IENT

OF THE NATURE OF CASE

The appellant, Ervin G. Richardson, appeals from the
decision of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr.,
Judge, denying the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On April 13, 1964, the petitioner filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake
County. On April 14, 1964, the writ of habeas corpus was
issued scheduling a hearing for the 27th day of April. On
the 27th day of April, 1964, the respondent filed its answer
and return to the writ of habeas corpus and a hearing was
had upon the petition. On May 6, 1964, the Honorable Ray
YanCott entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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2
Subsequently, on May 25, 1964, the appellant filed his
notice of appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the petition for writ of habeas
corpus was properly denied by the trial court, and this court
should affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus
alleging that he was convicted in the Third Judicial District
Court of Tooele County, Utah and committed to the Utah
State Penitentiary (R. 1). The sole basis upon which the
petitioner sought relief from his confinement was upon an
allegation that the crime which the appellant committed
took place on property under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States Government (R. 1). The respondent
answered, denying the allegation that the court was without jurisdiction. At the time of hearing, it was stipulated
between the parties that the petitioner, Ervin G. Richardson, was convicted upon plea of guilty of the crime of taking
indecent assault upon a child under the statutory age in violation of 76-7-9 of Utah Code Annotated 1953 (R. 15, 16).
It was further stipulated that the physical contact constituting the assault occurred on Dugway Proving Grounds in
Tooele, Utah. At the time of the commission of the crime,
the appellant was living at 60A East Second Avenue, at the
Dugway Proving Grounds in the southeast quarter section.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 was admitted into evidence, which was
a copy of order of the Secretary of Interior dated October
24, 1950, withdrawing certain portions of the public domain for use by the Army for military purposes. It was
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further stipulated that the crime was committed on a portion of the lands withdrawn for military purposes (R. 17).
It was further stipulated that the State of Utah never had
ownership of the lands but that proprietary ownership
rested in the United States (R. 17). At the time the crime
was committed, the lands were being used as a part of a
military reservation (R. 18).
There was no evidence before the court that the lands
\Yere being used for a military reservation at the time of
statehood, or that the State of Utah ever ceded legislative
jurisdiction over the lands. Further, there was no evidence
that the United States or any official of the United States
ever accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the area where
the crime was committed. The trial court expressly found
that the area wherein the crime was committed "never had
a legislative jurisdiction ceded from the State of Utah nor
has the Governor or other officials of the State of Utah filed
or executed any deed of cession for said area" (R. 8). Further, the court found that the subject lands were dedicated
to military uses by withdrawal from the public domain by
the act of the Secretary of Interior and that at no time has
the United States formally accepted exclusive jurisdiction
from the State of Utah over the said area, nor has the State
ever purported to transfer such jurisdiction (R. 9).
Based upon the above facts, it is submitted that as a matter of law, the appellants have not shown that the crime
was committed in an area where the United States exercises
exclusive jurisdiction.
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4
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE DISTRICT COURT IN WHICH THE APPELLANT
PLEAD GUILTY, WAS CONVICTED, AND COMMITTED,
HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON AND SUBJECT
MATTER AND THAT THE CRIME WAS NOT COMMITTED
UPON A MILITARY RESERVATION OVER WHICH THE
UNITED STATES EXERCISED EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.

The appellant's contention is that since the crime with
which he was charged was committed upon a military reservation that the state was without jurisdiction to prosecute,
it being contended that the federal government had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the reservation. The relevant facts in this regard show only that in 1950 the Secretary of Interior withdrew from the public domain certain
areas of land in Tooele County for the purposes of use by the
Department of the Army. There is no evidence that prior
to this withdrawal the subject lands (the lands upon which
the crime was committed) were being used for military purposes. The letter of the Secretary of Interior, effecting the
withdrawal, recites that the lands are being withdrawn
from "public appropriation." Consequently, prior to the
withdrawal, the lands were part of the general public domain subject to appropriation and private acquisition by
compliance with the various homestead and mining laws of
the United States. No evidence appears of record that the
subject lands were being used for military purposes at the
time of statehood or that at the time of statehood the
United States reserved jurisdiction over the lands in question. Additionally, there is no evidence demonstrating, that
the Legislature of the State of Utah ever consented to the
acquisition of "legislative jurisdiction" over the subject
lands or that the Governor of the State of Utah ever deeded
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5
"legislative jurisdiction" by a deed of cession. The appellant relies in part for its contention upon a statement contained in Article III, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of
the State of Utah disclaiming title to the unappropriated
public lands in the State of Utah. Prior to determining the
question of exclusive jurisdiction, it is well to note the difference between the power of the state to exercise its police
authority, and the ownership and title to lands. The United
States holds its lands primarily in a proprietary status. Fort
Lcm'cnworth RR v. LoweJ 114 U.S. 525 ( 1885). However,
this is an entirely different thing than the question of legislative jurisdiction. It is essential that the United States
have title to land before it may exercise jurisdiction thereover on the basis of land ownership alone. Ex parte H ebardJ
11 Fed. Cas. 1010, No. 6312 (C.C.D. Kan. 1877). Howrver, mere title alone does not give exclusive jurisdiction.
At the outset, it is important to ascertain the manner in
which exclusive jurisdiction or even legislative jurisdiction
of any kind may be obtained. The most comprehensive legal
study in this area is A Report of the Interdepartmental
Committee for the Study of jurisdiction over Federal Areas
Within the States 195 7. The report was the result of the
appointment of a committee by President Eisenhower
under the Attorney General to study the problem of jurisdiction over federal areas within the states. Since the report
is the most comprehensive legal treatise in the field, it will
be cited in this brief in many instances. (It will be cited
as Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, Part
II, 1957.) The Constitution of the United States, Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17, is the only constitutional expression
allowing the federal government to acquire exclusive jurisdiction over lands within state boundaries. This provision
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6
grants to congress the power to exercise exclusive legislation over:
"Such District as may become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be,
for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dockyards, and other needful Buildings."
As can be seen, the constitutional provision grants only
the power to exercise such exclusive jurisdiction over the
District of Columbia and those places purchased with the
consent of the Legislature of the state. In this instance there
was no purchase of the lands upon which the crime was
committed within the constitutional sense. See United
States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, No. 14867 (C.C.D. R.I.
1819). As Mr. Justice Story noted in 2 Story, Constitution,
Section 1224 ( 1847) acquisition pursuant to the constitutional allowance "can only be exercised at the will of the
state." Since it is as a matter of record that there was no
consent by the State of Utah in the instant case to the acquisition of legislative jurisdiction over the lands at Dugway
Proving Grounds involved in this case, appellant cannot
predicate exclusive jurisdiction on the constitutional provision.
A second method by which jurisdiction may be obtained
was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Fort Leavenworth RR v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 ( 1885). In
that case the Supreme Court held that the United States
obtained exclusive jurisdiction over Fort Leavenworth military reservation when the State of Kansas by legislative
enactment ceded to the United States the exclusive jurisdiction over the reservation. In the instant case, there was
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7
no cession of legislative jurisdiction over the subject lands
by the legislature of the State of Utah within the construction of the Fort Leavenworth RR case. Although 63-8-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provided a general grant allowing the federal government to take legislative jurisdiction over military reservations, the exercise of this grant is
dependent upon the Governor executing appropriate conveyances ceding the jurisdiction, 63-8-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953. In the instant case, there has been no such conveyance. Further, even if it is assumed that the legislative
grants in 63-8-1 operated as a cession on the part of the
state, there has been no acceptance by the United States.
R.S. 355, 54 Stat. 19, 33 U.S.C. 733, 40 U.S.C. 255, 50
U.S.C. 175, enacted February 1, 1940, provided as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
obtaining of exclusive jurisdiction in the United States
over lands or interests therein which have been or shall
hereafter be acquired by it shall not be required; but
the head or other authorized officer of any department
or independent establishment or agency of the Government may, in such cases and at such times as he may
deem desirable, accept or secure from the State in
which any lands or interests therein under his immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control are situated, consent to or cession of such jurisdiction, exclusive or partial, not theretofore obtained, over any such lands or
interests as he may deem desirable and indicate acceptance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the United States
by filing a notice of such acceptance with the Governor
of such State or in such manner as may be prescribed
by the laws of the State where such lands are situated.
U,nl~ss and until the United States has accepted jurisdzctzon over lands, hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such
jurisdiction has been accepted."
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8
This statute, which would have been applicable to any
action involving the subject lands of this case, requires
affirmative action by the federal government expressly consenting to the state's cession. In Adams v. United States,
319 U.S. 312 ( 1943); People v. Brown, 69 Cal.App.2d 602,
159 P.2d 686 ( 1945), the provisions of the act of February
1, 1940 (40 U.S.C. 255) requirethattheheadoftheagency
file notice of acceptance with the state. The agency involved
to obtain jurisdiction in this instance, would have been the
War Department and no such acceptance has been filed.
Further, in Adams v. United States, supra, the United
States Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Black, approved
opinions of the Judge Advocate of the Army and the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture that notice of acceptance must be filed if the government is to obtain concurrent
(and necessarily exclusive) jurisdiction. This has not been
done in the instant case. Exhibit 3 from the Secretary of
Interior, who is not the authorized officer, is merely a notice
of withdrawal and in no way attempts to consent to acceptance over jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellant cannot
contend that there has been an appropriate acceptance.
The appellant in his brief argues that the correspondence
between the Secretary of Interior and Governor Maw
should be deemed an acceptance. It is suffice to note that
there is no evidence of record of any such correspondence
and Governor Maw was not the Governor of the State of
Utah at the time of the transfer of the lands involved in the
instant case.
The third method by which the federal government may
acquire exclusive jurisdiction over an area within the state
is apparently the method the appellant relies upon. This
is by federal reservation. This concept was recognized in
Fort Leavenworth RR v. Lowe, supra. However, the reser-

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
vat ion must be a reservation at the time of statehood. Thus
in Afilitary Reservations and Navigable Waters, Department ofthe Army ( 1961), it is stated:
"Congress has in several instances reserved jurisdiction over specified areas in connection with the admission of a state into the Union. This method of preserving legislative jurisdiction in the federal government
was also recognized by the Supreme Court in the case
of Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe wherein the court
stated by way of dicta:
'Congress might undoubtedly upon such admission have stipulated for retention of the political
authority, dominion and legislative power of the
United States over the Reservation, so long as it
should be used for military purposes by the government; that is, it could have excepted the place from
the jurisdiction of Kansas, as one needed for the
uses of the general government.'
"Where the enabling act admitting a state into the
Union contains no provision retaining jurisdiction in
the United States over a military reservation located
in the state, federal jurisdiction over the reservation
exists only if jurisdiction is ceded by the newly formed
state."
See also Rogers v. Squire, 157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 840 ( 194 7) ; Olsen v. M cPortlin, 105
F. Supp. 561 (D.C. :rvfinn. 1952). In this instance the evidence shows the lands in question were not reserved for
military purposes at the time of statehood, rather were only
withdra\1\'11 from the public domain in 1950. Consequently,
the appellant has no basis under the reservation theory
either.
The appellant seems to argue that if the lands were withdra\\n from the public domain for the uses of a fort, maga-
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zine or arsenal, etc. and if the lands had never been used
by the State of Utah or title vested in the State of Utah, that
the withdrawal for military uses automatically vests exclusive jurisdiction in the United States. In jurisdiction Over
Federal Areas Within the States, Part II. supra (1957),
page 45, it is noted:
"It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has
been a transfer of jurisdiction ( 1) pursuant to clause
17 by a Federal acquisition of land with State consent,
or ( 2) by cession from the State to the Federal Government, or unless the Federal Government has reserved jurisdiction upon the admission of the State, the
Federal Government possesses no legislative jurisdiction over any area within a State, such jurisdiction
being for exercise entirely by the State, subject to noninterference by the State with Federal functions, and
subject to the free exercise by the Federal Government
of rights with respect to the use, protection. and disposition of its property.
"* * * The Federal Government cannot, by unilateral action on its part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area within the exterior boundaries of a
Statt=>.* * *''
In Military Reservations and Navigable Waters, Department of the Army ( 1961) page 29, the following is stated:
"There are three methods by which the United
States acquires jurisdiction over land located within
one of the several states: consent to purchase, cession,
and reservation." (Citing People v. Godfrey, 117
Johns. R. 225, N.Y.1819.)
See also AFM 110-3 Civil Law, Department of the Air
Force ( 1959) page 50403.
In Silas Mason Company v. The Tax Commission, 302
lJ.S. 186 ( 1937) the United States Supreme Court noted
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that the question of whether or not the state has yielded to
the federal government exclusive legislative authority over
lands acquired by the federal government is a federal question. In that case, the United States Supreme Court noted:
"* * * The acquisition of title by the United States
is not sufficient to effect that exclusion. It must appear
that the State, by consent or cession, has transferred
to the United States that residuum of jurisdiction
which otherwise it would be free to exercise.* * *"
See also United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 ( 1930);
Anno. 74 L.Ed. 138. It is apparent, therefore, that the
United States cannot obtain exclusive jurisdiction over
lands merely by withdrawing them from the public domain
and restricting public entry by committing them to military
purposes. In Rothfels v. Southworth, 11 U.2d 169,356 P.2d
612 (1960), this court noted that some parts of Dugway
Proving Grounds are under exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States and other parts are not. Loc. Cit., page 173.
In the instant case, the evidence before the trial court and
that now before this court on appeal conclusively demonstrates that the actions necessary for the United States to
obtain exclusive jurisdiction over the lands in question (and
where the appellant committed the crime for which he is
being held) have not been taken. The requirement for the
United States to obtain exclusive jurisdiction involves the
consent of the state; and with reference to acquisition under
the constitutional powers of the United States it has been
generally said that it "exclude[sJ from its operation places
which had been part of the public domain and have been
resen·ed from sale." jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, Part II ( 195 7) page 67.
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A case demonstrating the unreasonableness of the appellant's theory is that of Six Cos. Inc. v. DeVinney, 2 Fed.
Supp. 693 (D.C. Nevada 1933). In that case, the plaintiff
contended that the United States had obtained lands for a
federal project by withdrawal from the public domain by
the Secretary of Interior and that as a consequence, this
vested exclusive jurisdiction in the United States thus divesting the State of Nevada of its tax power. The court
expressly ruled that a portion of the public domain could
not be withdrawn for a governmental purpose and thereby
divest the state of jurisdiction. The court ruled that the
Secretary of Interior had no power to establish a reservation
by withdrawing from the public domain federal lands and
committing them to specific governmental usages. (Headnote No.4) The court noted that an expression of opinion
contained in letters between the Secretary of Interior and
the Governor of the State of Nevada were not effective to
result in exclusive jurisdiction. The court stated:
"It is here appropriate to say that expressions of
opinion contained in the letters passing between the
Secretary of the Interior and the Governor are without
force as affecting the validity or invalidity of the reservation.***''

See also St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Satterfield,
27 F.2d 586 (8 Circ. 1928). In that case, the facts are sub"itantially similar to those in the instant case and the court
held that the State of Oklahoma had not relinquished jurisdiction over Fort Reno so as to divest the state of its authority to exercise police and taxing powers on the reservation. The appellant relies upon the case of the State v.
Tully, 31 Mont. 365, 78 P. 360 ( 1904) for the proposition
that committing federal lands to military use gives the fed-
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era! government exclusive jurisdiction. A reading of that
case makes it manifest that it is inapplicable to the present
situation. That case involved a situation where the Fort
l\Iissoula Military Reservation was created prior to statehood and where the Montana Supreme Court determined
that there was a reservation of the area involved in the case
by the United States and that the Montana Constitution, at
the time of statehood, expressly relinquished jurisdiction
over the reservation. Simple reading of the case shows that
it is manifestly opposite to the case now before the court.
Subsequently, in United States v. Tully, 140 F. 899 (C.C.D.
Mont. 1905), the federal court determined that the United
States did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the Fort Missoula Military Reservation. Since the question of exclusive
jurisdiction is a federal question, another reason for not
applying the Tully rule is apparent.
In this case, it is clear that:

1. The United States did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction over the subject lands whereon the crime
was committed pursuant to Article I, Section 8,
Clause 17 of the federal constitution since there
was no purchase with the consent of the state.
2. The United States did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of cession from the State of Utah
since the State of Utah did not cede jurisdiction,
the governor did not issue deeds of cession nor did
the federal government accept exclusive jurisdiction. All that happened was a simple withdrawal
of federal lands from the public domain.
3. The United States did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction by reservation at the time of statehood.
Since the means by which exclusive jurisdiction
may be obtained have not been shown in the instant case, it is apparent that appellant is properly
being held pursuant to valid state process.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant has filed for a writ of habeas corpus attacking the jurisdiction of the court before which he plead
guilty and from which he received judgment. It is apparent
that there was no basis in law or fact for the contention that
the court was without jurisdiction. This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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